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• International Space Station (ISS): 
• Assessed risk change to ISS hardware & EVA suits from ORDEM 3.0 (charts 3-5)
• Identified MMOD damage in on-orbit photos of ISS radiators and solar arrays 
(charts 6-9)
• Continue planning on-orbit inspection of visiting vehicle thermal protection systems 
prior to undock 
• Continue damage detection & repair work (joint international working group)
• Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Commercial Crew & Resupply 
Vehicles:
• Performed post-flight MMOD damage inspections of SpaceX Dragon cargo vehicle 
after ISS resupply missions, and Orion vehicle after exploration flight test 1 (charts 
10-15)
• Performed risk assessments and hypervelocity impact tests to verify compliance to 
MMOD requirements
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Past Environment vs. Future Risk; > 3 
mm
ISS altitude (400 km)
• Predicted spatial density in the 
future is somewhat higher than pre-
2007 measured values even though 
the contribution from the two 
collisions has dropped to very low 
levels.
• Part of the increase is due to 
averaging 120 different future 
“realities.”
– Each future Monte Carlo environment has 
0, 1, 2, or more future collisions or 
explosions at “random” times.
• The future level is an accurate 
representation of the risk to ISS.
Note:  Public release version will not 
produce data prior to 2010
Past Future
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• Addition of steel particles in ORDEM 3.0 debris flux increases overall risk 
to ISS compared to results using previous debris model (ORDEM 2000)
• Overall trend is for lightly shielded items to have higher risk and better protected items 
have lower risk
Risk of penetration over 10-years
1/2015 – 12/2024
(penetration = hole in crew module pressure shell, failure of external pressurized 
tanks & CMGs)
ORDEM 3.0 + 
MEM
ORDEM 2000 + 
MEM
ISS Risk 34% 25%
ISS PNP (PNP=1-Risk) 0.662 0.751
Note: ORDEM = orbital debris model, MEM = meteoroid model
PNP = probability of no penetration
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MMOD damage on ISS photovoltaic (PV) 
radiator 
• Indication found on 30 June 2014 (Port 4 truss PV radiator)
• Exit hole shown below measures 5” x 3.9” (13 cm x 10 cm)
• Entry hole on opposite side is 0.7” x 0.5” (1.8 cm x 1.3 cm)
• Initial estimated MMOD particle size causing damage: 4 mm to 5 mm dia.
exit hole
entry 
damage
exit hole 
close-up
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Ground hypervelocity impact test MMOD 
damage compared to P4 photovoltaic 
radiator damage
• Exit hole damage from 4.5 mm diameter aluminum spherical projectile at 
7.08 km/s and 50 deg impact angle (angle from target normal) compares 
fairly well with actual damage
On-orbit exit 
damage
Ground-test 
exit damage
Ground-test 
exit damage
Ground-test 
entry damage
Comparison of exit damage
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Solar array 3A, panel 58
MMOD hole 
7mm diameter
Disconnected bypass diode
MMOD hole
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Solar array 2A, panel 66
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• Current Status
• Inspection performed on back shell panels, base heat shield, crew module 
windows and docking hatch 
• 6 damages identified on back shell TPS that are potentially from MMOD
• Removed tiles with 5 of these 6 damages for non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and 
scanning electron microscopy (SEM)
• 41 pits identified on crew module and docking hatch windows
• Forward Work
• NDE characterization of selected MMOD damage sites
• Scanning Electron Microscopy of MMOD damage sites
• Final disposition of damage sites and comparisons to impact predictions
• Documentation
EFT-1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection
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Surface ROI Capsule Preliminary
Type # Region Material Length Width Depth Sample Disposition
TPS 4 Panel A, Tile 33 AETB-8 0.51 0.50 0.50 intact extraction of tile possible MMOD 
TPS 7 Panel  C, Tile 73 AETB-8 1.29 1.10 0.05 intact extraction of tile possible MMOD 
TPS 20 Panel H, Tile 144 AETB-8 0.63 0.56 0.54 intact extraction of tile possible MMOD 
TPS 23 Panel I, Tile 45 AETB-8 1.18 1.15 0.60 TBD possible MMOD 
TPS 24 Panel F, Tile 45 AETB-8 1.06 1.02 1.02 intact extraction of tile possible MMOD 
TPS 25 Panel A, Tile 8 AETB-8 1.88 1.27 0.70 intact extraction of tile possible MMOD 
 
Feature Size (mm)
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4
Panel A, Tile 33
Feature Size = 0.51 x 0.50 mm
Depth= 0.50 mm
Panel C, Tile 73
Feature Size = 1.29 x 1.10 mm
Depth= 0.05 mm
7 20
Panel H, Tile 144
Feature Size = 0.63 x 0.56 mm
Depth= 0.54 mm
23
Panel I, Tile 45
Feature Size = 1.18 x 1.15 mm
Depth= 0.60 mm
Panel F, Tile 45
Feature Size = 1.06 x 1.02 mm
Depth= 1.02 mm
Panel A, Tile 8
Feature Size = 1.88 x 1.27 mm
Depth= 0.70 mm
24 25
EFT-1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection
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23 24 25
EFT-1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection
Panel A, Tile 33
Feature Size = 0.51 x 0.50 mm
Depth= 0.50 mm
Panel C, Tile 73
Feature Size = 1.29 x 1.10 mm
Depth= 0.05 mm
Panel H, Tile 144
Feature Size = 0.63 x 0.56 mm
Depth= 0.54 mm
Panel I, Tile 45
Feature Size = 1.18 x 1.15 mm
Depth= 0.60 mm
Panel F, Tile 45
Feature Size = 1.06 x 1.02 mm
Depth= 1.02 mm
Panel A, Tile 8
Feature Size = 1.88 x 1.27 mm
Depth= 0.70 mm
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Backshell Tile Damage Predictions 
compared to Observations
ORDEM 3.0 Analysis Predicts One Tile 
Cavity of 0.36 mm depth
ORDEM2000 Analysis Predicts 
One Tile Cavity of 0.16 mm depth
ROI # 4
0.50 mm
OD3: 38%
OD2k: 14%
ROI # 20
0.54 mm
OD3: 34%
OD2k: 12%
If confirmed to be 
caused by MMOD, 
multiple cavities of 0.5 
mm depth or greater 
exceeds analysis 
prediction for either 
environment.
The higher prediction of 
ORDEM 3.0 would then 
be more accurate.
Using ORDEM2000
Smallest damage sizes are ~70% OD / ~30% MM
Medium damage sizes are ~85% OD / ~15% MM
Largest damage sizes are ~90% OD / ~10% MM
Using ORDEM 3.0
All damage sizes are ~95% OD / ~5% MM
ROI # 23
0.60 mm
OD3: 27%
OD2k: 10%
ROI # 25
0.70 mm
OD3: 19%
OD2k: 7%
ROI # 24
1.02 mm
OD3: 7%
OD2k: 3%
ROI # 4
ROI # 20
ROI # 23
ROI # 25
ROI # 24
ROI # 7
ROI # 7
0.05 mm
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EFT-1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection
Window impact
19. +Y Forward
Internal Fracture  ≈ 0.51 x 0.41 mm
Crater ≈ 0.32 x 0.30 mm
Depth= TBD mm
#19
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Backup Charts
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after addition of MLM, Russian Node, and BEAM modules, and after PMM relocation
Each color represents a different MMOD shield configuration
(~500 different shields protect ISS modules and external pressure vessels)
Progress @ MRM2 Progress @ SM
Soyuz @ NM
Soyuz @ MRM1
PMM
BEAM
MLM
Node Module
